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This paper examines the implications of demutualization of financial exchanges for their 
roles as self-regulatory organizations. Many regulators and exchanges believe that 
conflicts of interest increase when exchanges convert to for-profit businesses. 
Demutualization also changes the nature of an exchange’s regulatory role as broker-
dealers’ ownership interests are reduced.  These factors are leading to reduced regulatory 
roles for exchanges in many jurisdictions. 
The resulting changes have significant implications for regulation of financial markets, 
especially as exchanges are the only SROs in most countries. Major changes in the role of 
exchanges require a rethinking of the allocation of regulatory functions and the role of 
self-regulation, as well as stronger mechanisms to mitigate conflicts of interest.  
The paper looks at the views of both exchanges and regulators on these issues in Asian, 
European and North American jurisdictions where major exchanges have converted to 
for-profit businesses. We found that views on the conflicts of interest faced by 
demutualized exchanges vary widely.  In addition, the tools and processes used by 
exchanges and regulators to manage conflicts also differ significantly across jurisdictions.  
The paper concludes that new and greater conflicts result from demutualization, and 





The World Bank is frequently asked to advise policymakers, regulators and 
counterparts in emerging markets around the world on how to ensure sound regulation 
and supervision of markets, since developing market integrity and investor confidence 
forms part of the foundation for successful financial markets. Given its advisory role, the 
Bank believes it is important to understand and be in a position to advise its clients on the 
implications of demutualization of financial exchanges and possible responses to the 
public policy issues that arise. 
This study was commissioned to examine the implications of demutualization for 
the regulatory roles of financial exchanges. Demutualization changes the nature of an 
exchange’s regulatory role. As broker-dealer ownership of an exchange declines, the 
exchange ceases to be a self-regulatory body as traditionally defined. Exchanges are 
increasingly described as front-line regulators for this reason.
1 This change is causing 
exchanges to narrow their focus to regulation of their own markets. Our research 
produced a wide range of views on exchanges’ regulatory roles and the degree of conflict 
of interest that arises in converting to a for-profit model. Views range across the 
spectrum, from “it is business as usual” to “everything has changed”. 
This paper addresses the following issues: 
 
  What conflicts of interest do for-profit exchanges face? 
  How do these conflicts of interest differ from those faced by traditional broker 
owned and operated exchanges? 
  How are potential conflicts of interest faced by demutualized exchanges actually 
being managed?  
  What conclusions can be reached from the experience gained to date in managing 
these potential conflicts of interest? 
 
It is broadly accepted that market integrity is a cornerstone of vibrant capital 
markets. Investor confidence in the fairness of markets is a prerequisite to broad-based 
participation in markets. If exchanges reduce their regulatory roles, or relinquish them 
entirely, there are significant implications for regulatory structures in financial markets, 
especially as exchanges are the only SROs in the great majority of jurisdictions. Major 
changes in the role of exchanges may require a rethinking of the allocation of functions 
between self-regulators and statutory regulators and changes in the organizational 
structure of SROs. 
Although securities exchanges are only one of the institutions that comprise the 
infrastructure of a capital market, their role is fundamental because exchanges are 
producers of public goods that traditionally have been necessary for liquid secondary 
markets to develop. Liquid markets are in turn a basic prerequisite to effective primary 
                                                 
1   The terms self-regulation and SRO are still used in this paper for consistency.   
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markets. As such, exchanges’ roles lie at the heart of the capital formation process and 
economic development. 
Exchanges’ regulatory roles have also historically been an important part of their 
value. As SROs, exchanges not only operate markets that bring buyers and sellers of 
capital together, they are also important sources of standards and safeguards that are 
designed to facilitate efficient markets and promote market integrity. Exchanges’ 
regulatory roles are a significant contributor to securities markets’ credibility. 
While approaches vary widely, our research into the evolving role of exchanges 
confirms that several general trends are developing, and there is an increasing consensus 
on the major factors that determine an exchange’s approach to regulation in the new 
environment. These factors are: 
  Demutualization triggers changes in exchanges’ strategies and priorities that 
inevitably impact an exchange’s regulatory roles. 
  Exchanges are increasingly concentrating on core regulatory roles that are directly 
tied to business operations, such as market surveillance.  
  Most exchanges are reluctant to outsource regulatory functions generally, and 
especially market surveillance, because they feel it is important to be close to the 
market. 
  Certain regulatory functions and powers are migrating from exchanges to 
securities commissions or independent SROs in many countries. 
 
The core regulatory issue raised by demutualization is whether the conflicts of 
interest between business and regulatory mandates are manageable.  This issue must be 
examined from both a business and a regulatory standpoint. It is possible for regulators 
and exchanges to conclude that the conflicts can be managed from a regulatory point of 
view, but for some exchanges to conclude that they are not manageable from a business 
point of view. 
A lot of the debate about conflicts seems to be about where to draw the line on 
regulatory roles. While there is no international consensus on this point, if there is any 
convergence of views, it appears to be that exchanges’ roles should focus on functions 
that are directly tied to their business activities. In general, exchanges exhibit a high 
comfort level with their current regulatory roles, regardless of whether they are narrow or 
broad. Exchanges also tend to believe they can perform their traditional regulatory 
functions better than anyone else – that services must be performed in-house and cannot 
be contracted out or transferred to public authorities.  
Regulators are attentive to potential conflicts and have addressed the issues, but 
do not want to mandate significant changes in the absence of evidence that conflicts have 
become a real and bigger problem. A majority of regulators believe conflicts are likely to 
be exacerbated in for-profit exchanges, but feel the conflicts are manageable. Regulators 
are aware that exchanges are increasingly focused on competition, and that conflicts are 
likely to become a bigger issue as a result. If exchanges start to lose market share, 
pressures to level the playing field will intensify quickly, especially if they are competing  
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with markets that have minimal regulatory obligations or that free ride on others’ 
regulatory investments. 
Exchanges and regulators have employed a range of responses in order to manage 
conflicts of interest. While the specific mechanisms vary widely, responses fall into the 
following general categories: 
  Enhance corporate governance requirements 
  Impose ownership restrictions 
  Reinforce exchange’s public interest mandate 
  Upgrade supervision by regulator 
  Strengthen exchange internal controls and management processes 
  Transfer regulatory functions to an independent SRO 
  Transfer regulatory functions to the Public Regulator. 
 
While the scope and importance of self-regulation in a particular jurisdiction 
reflect broad historical factors and public policy decisions, the reasons given by 
exchanges and regulators for either maintaining or reducing exchanges’ regulatory roles 
after demutualization occurs are quite different.  Exchanges cite business reasons in 
support of their regulatory roles whereas regulators focus on the public interest.   
Demutualization may also be seen as an opportunity to redefine exchanges’ 
responsibilities in order to improve the quality and efficiency of market regulation. 
While market integrity and confidence are vital attributes for any market, 
emerging markets face particular challenges. As noted by FEAS,
2 major obstacles exist in 
many emerging markets that make development of the necessary infrastructure and 
investor confidence difficult. Consequently, regulatory roles of exchanges in emerging 
markets are more sensitive than in developed countries, where reasonable levels of 
market integrity, regulatory compliance and investor confidence have already been 
established.
3   
Emerging markets may also be less able to sustain the injury caused by regulatory 
problems and scandals because the basic conditions required to establish market integrity, 
such as effective legal and regulatory systems, effective institutions, sound corporate 
governance and disclosure may not be in place. The exchanges’ roles are crucial to 
building institutional capacity and effective systems. 
                                                 
2    Working Group on Capital Markets Development of the Federation of Euro-Asian Stock Exchanges 
(2001). The report notes a host of problems, including abuses in privatization programs in transition 
economies, lack of investor protection standards (especially minority shareholder rights), inadequate 
disclosure standards, and entrenched cultures of self-dealing, that contribute to the obstacles. Even 
where adequate rules and regulations exist, lack of effective enforcement is often a major problem, for a 
range of reasons. 
3    The recent market scandals in the U.S. and other developed markets illustrate that no market is immune 
to abuses and dishonest practices that threaten market integrity and investor confidence. While 
developed markets are currently suffering a decline in investor confidence, arguably the foundations of 
the system remain intact.  
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We acknowledge at the outset that there are no clear right or wrong answers to the 
issues addressed in this paper. For-profit markets are a recent phenomenon, and both 
exchanges and regulators are working through the issues as they unfold. Responses to 
conflicts and other issues are still being tested. Many exchanges remain in the process of 
demutualization, or are planning for it. Even those exchanges that have completed the 
formal process are still in the midst of transformation to a business culture and 
commercial orientation. 
The paper’s findings should be seen in the context of broader issues relevant to 
the development of capital markets, such as whether demutualization is a beneficial form 
of organization for financial exchanges and whether self-regulation is effective. However, 
analyzing the business implications of demutualization are beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
The paper is organized as follows. Part 2 provides a global overview of 
exchanges’ corporate and regulatory status as of September 30, 2002. Part 3 comments 
on the implications of demutualization for exchanges’ regulatory roles and analyzes the 
types of conflicts of interest exchanges face. Part 4 surveys responses that exchanges and 
regulators have put in place to manage potential conflicts of interest. Part 5 sets out the 
conclusions reached from our analysis of the findings and points to the future of 
exchanges’ conflicts management. 
GLOBAL OVERVIEW 
The global trend to demutualization of financial exchanges and the entry of new 
for-profit market operators
4 has raised a host of issues about the business viability of 
exchanges, their role in the regulation of markets, and their public interest roles or 
mandates. Most financial exchanges are also self-regulatory organizations. 
Demutualization is perceived to create new conflicts of interest between the business 
operations of an exchange and its regulatory role.  It raises significant questions about the 
extent to which exchanges should continue to act as self-regulatory organizations. 
Demutualization generally refers to the process of converting from a non-profit, 
mutually owned broker-dealer membership organization to a shareholder-owned, for-
profit corporation. Members of a mutual exchange are both owners with voting rights and 
users with trading privileges. In a fully demutualized exchange, shareholders are 
investors in the business of the exchange. Trading rights of participants in the market run 
by the exchange are created by separate contracts between the participant and the 
exchange. The board of directors and corporate governance structure of the exchange 
reflects the broader share ownership. 
The table below summarizes the corporate status of members and affiliates of the 
World Federation of Exchanges as of March 2003.  
 
                                                 
4    Including electronic communications networks (ECNs), alternative trading systems (ATSs) and 





















Demutualized    8    5  19  10  0  42 
Listed    3    1  10    4  0  18 
In process of 
demutualization    2    3    3    7  1  16 
Not considering 
demutualization    2    3    9    6  7  27 
Total  12 11 31 23  8  85 














The decision to demutualize an exchange is made for commercial and, in some 
cases, public policy reasons.  In both cases, it is the commercial objective of making the 
exchange more competitive and efficient that drives the process. Technological advances 
and globalization have both broken down barriers in the investment markets, forcing 
financial exchanges to redefine their role and structure in order to survive. In emerging 
markets, another important goal is to reform ownership and governance to reduce the 
influence of brokers or government. 
Government policy has been the driving force behind demutualizations in many 
emerging markets. For instance, in Hong Kong, Singapore, the Philippines and Malaysia, 
the consolidation and demutualization of exchanges has been one part of broader plans to 
bolster the competitiveness, efficiency and fairness of the capital markets sector of the 
economy. Countries such as Thailand and India are looking at following a similar path. 
Demutualization fundamentally changes the orientation and mandate of an 
exchange from a cooperative to a business. This in turn necessitates a number of other 
changes, both internal and external, in order to transform the organization into one whose 
benchmarks are based on financial performance. Demutualization triggers dramatic 
changes in exchanges’ governance structures, managements, organizations and internal 
processes and procedures. These changes are imperative if a successful transition to 














Box 1 describes self-regulatory functions frequently performed by financial 
exchanges around the world. Our study found that demutualization triggers changes in 
exchanges’ strategies and priorities that inevitably impact an exchange’s regulatory roles. 
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
Many observers believe for-profit exchanges exacerbate the conflicts of interests 
between the business of operating a market and the responsibilities of acting as a front-
line regulator and that the core regulatory issue that demutualization raises is whether for-
 
Box 1:  Self-regulatory functions performed by exchanges 
   SRO functions that are frequently performed by securities exchanges around the world are listed 
below. The scope and tradition of self-regulation varies widely, and most exchanges only perform a 
subset of these. 
1. Broker-Dealer Regulation  
1.1  Member or Participant qualifications for registration  
1.2   Capital adequacy regulations (net capital and margin requirements)  
1.3   Financial examinations 
1.4   Custody and account segregation  
1.5   Books and records requirements 
1.6   Business conduct and sales compliance rules  
1.7   Compliance examinations  
2. Market Regulation  
2.1   Qualifications for access to trading by firms and traders 
2.2   Market conduct rules (market integrity and ethical standards)  
2.3   Trading rules (operational and trading system "business rules")  
2.4   Market quality rules (e.g. market maker obligations)  
2.5   Market surveillance and supervision of trading 
2.6   Examinations of member trading operations 
2.7   Market investigations  
3. Clearing and Depository  
3.1   Clearing rules and procedures  
3.2   Settlement rules  
3.3   Depository rules and procedures  
4. Listings and Product Standards  
4.1   New listings standards  
4.2   Continued listings standards  
4.3   Contract specifications 
4.4     Corporate conduct rules (disclosure requirements, corporate governance standards) 
4.5   Shareholder protection rules (approval of transactions that affect public or minority 
 shareholders) 
4.6   Filing requirements  
5. Enforcement  
5.1   Formal investigations  
5.2   Discipline  
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profit exchanges will continue to effectively perform their regulatory and public interest 
responsibilities. 
Concerns about conflicts of interest are generally lower in futures markets 
because the markets are not as regulated as securities markets. Futures markets 
participants are mainly professionals and made up of sophisticated players. Retail 
investor participation is small.
5  Also, the regulatory framework is different because 
futures exchanges have no capital formation role, and the contracts are a product created 
by the exchanges. The difference in approach is more evident in the U.S. where futures 
exchanges are governed by a separate regulatory regime. Elsewhere one regulator 
prevails, and securities and futures exchanges are merging, leading to a harmonized 
approach to the two market segments. 
An emerging high-level consensus of views between regulators and exchanges 
The primary reasons cited by exchanges for retaining regulatory functions are that 
they support the exchange’s reputation and "brand name"; improve market integrity and 
quality which are central to the product; enable the exchange to control the features and 
standards of its products and services through its rules and policies; give the exchange the 
ability to significantly influence the substance, quality and cost of regulation; and ensure 
self-regulation is maintained. 
The majority of exchanges tended to dismiss the conflict debate, partly because 
they know conflicts have always been present. They view the conflict issue in relative 
terms, and feel the concern is overblown because it is not new. In fact, the prevalence of 
this comment suggests that exchanges may have been subject to greater pressure from 
members on regulatory issues and resources than many realize.  Exchange executives on 
the front line of regulatory programs often said that the conflict is probably greater in a 
membership organization. The view that accountability to a board of directors in a 
corporate model is preferable to the governance and management pressures in a mutual 
was widespread. 
Exchanges are asking several significant questions: 
  What functions are core to the business and directly add value to the exchange’s 
products and services? 
  Where does the exchange have a comparative advantage in terms of knowledge, 
skills and expertise over alternative regulators? 
  Does the exchange have the necessary jurisdiction and powers to carry out the 
function? 
  Do the exchange’s functions overlap with activities of other regulators? 
 
When exchanges drill down in their analysis of their regulatory activities, some 
are concluding that functions such as broker-dealer regulation and listing rules that 
govern corporate conduct (as opposed to standards for admission to the official list of the 
                                                 
5  Of course, this may vary based on the specific product involved and by jurisdiction.  
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exchange) are really not strongly related to their product and service standards. From a 
business standpoint, these regulatory functions can also create unnecessary friction in 
customer relationships which can be avoided if the functions are transferred to another 
regulator.  As a result, these types of functions are migrating from exchanges to 
government authorities in many countries. Exchanges are increasingly focusing on core 
regulatory roles that are directly tied to business operations, such as trading supervision.  
In discussing the issue with exchanges, managements tend to prioritize business 
needs such as product development, IT needs and finance. Regulation is a secondary 
consideration, and is often somewhat of a protected area because of its historic place in 
the organization, its quasi-public character and the high degree of scrutiny from 
regulatory authorities. 
In some respects, exchanges are coming full circle – they are retreating to 
regulation based on their commercial interests, which was the origin of their regulatory 
activities. Demutualization therefore raises legitimate questions about the degree of 
reliance regulators should place on exchanges’ self-regulatory roles, especially functions 
that are quasi-public in nature, such as dealing with insider trading or corporate 
disclosure. 
Regulators see many public policy reasons for reducing exchanges’ regulatory 
responsibilities, including the need to minimize conflicts of interest; recognition that 
many areas of regulation are more effectively delivered by public regulators; the 
opportunity to promote market development by improving regulatory efficiency and 
reducing an exchange’s costs; and removing obstacles to competition in securities 
trading. Also, where multiple SROs exist, opportunities to consolidate SROs, harmonize 
standards and increase efficiency may arise. 
However, a significant factor for many regulators is that transferring, or requiring 
significant changes to, exchanges’ regulatory roles is not an option, because the 
exchange’s SRO role is enshrined in law. For instance, U.S. securities and futures 
exchanges have a legal obligation to regulate their markets under applicable legislation, 
and the SEC and CFTC are obligated to ensure the exchanges carry out their 
responsibilities diligently. In the case of the CFTC, the Commission concluded that the 
overall regulatory risk level was no higher post-demutualization, although the nature of 
certain risks changed and they adjusted their oversight accordingly. The SEC appears to 
have concluded that conflicts are greater, but has stepped back from demanding complete 
separation of SRO functions from the business. 
Of course, exchanges’ and regulators’ responses must reflect local conditions and 
circumstances, which are important determinants of the scope of conflicts of interest. It is 
also possible for regulators and exchanges to conclude that the conflicts can be managed 
from a regulatory point of view, but for some exchanges to conclude that they are not 
manageable from a business point of view – that regulatory roles need to be reduced or 
transferred elsewhere to enable the exchange’s board and management to devote their 
energy and resources to achieving commercial success. 
 
One of the most interesting findings of our study is that exchanges’ and 
regulators’ responses to the issue of what regulatory roles are appropriate for  
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demutualized exchanges, and what safeguards should be put in place to deal with 
conflicts of interest, vary dramatically.  The approach is not at all consistent across 
jurisdictions. In fact, many responses are unique, reflecting both local conditions and 
local ideas about conflicts and how they might be managed. We are too early in the 
demutualization trend for countries’ responses to have converged, notwithstanding the 
fact that both exchanges and regulators are following events in other jurisdictions. 
From a public policy standpoint, the fact that exchanges are highly regulated 
entities is a significant source of protection in itself. The requirements and powers set out 
in the law and regulations can be deployed to address conflict of interest issues. 
Regulators have extensive tools to deal with any concerns raised by demutualization. In 
this regard, both regulators and exchanges recognize ongoing oversight of exchanges as 
an important safeguard, because it is a continuous and responsive process. Exchanges 
cannot simply obtain approval for demutualization, and close the book on the question. In 
most jurisdictions, close contact between the regulators and exchanges, especially the 
SRO section, is a feature of the system. An additional layer of scrutiny by the 
government is also present in many jurisdictions. 
Types of conflicts of interest 
Observers categorize conflicts of interest in different ways. We have identified the 
following sources of conflict of interest between the business operations and SRO 
responsibilities of an exchange. Some are “old conflicts” that have always existed (but 
may be exacerbated or reduced by demutualization); others are “new conflicts” that arise 




   
Box 2.  Summary of Types of Conflict of Interest 
1.  Conflict between Business and Regulation Mandates 
1.1  Acting in shareholders’ interest by maximizing value vs. acting in the public interest as 
an SRO. 
2.  Conflict in Funding Regulation 
3.  Conflict in administration 
3.1  Maintaining high regulatory standards and rules 
3.2 Thoroughness  of  regulatory  programs 
3.3  Independent administration of rules and requirements 
3.4  Independent decisions on investigations and enforcement 
3.5  Regulation of owners and key customers who provide business and revenue 
3.6  Regulation of membership association whose interests the exchange’s rule is to promote 
and protect 
4.  Conflict in regulating competitors 
4.1  Regulation of members of trading participants that compete with the exchange in 
providing liquidity of trading services 
4.2  Regulation of listed companies that compete with the exchange in providing business 
services (or conversely, favouring business partners) 
-  Rulemaking that favours the exchange’s business or is biased against a competing 
business. 
-  Using investigation and enforcement powers in a biased manner 
-  Making administrative decisions affecting firms that compete with the exchange in a 
biased or unfair manner. 
-  Predatory regulatory practices such as delays in responding to complaints or 
imposition of burdensome procedures. 
-  Improper use of confidential information about regulated firms for business instead of 
regulatory purposes. 
5. Self-listing  conflict 
5.1  Exchange assessing whether it meets its own listing requirements 
5.2  Exchange monitoring trading in its own stock and making decisions on the need to 
review or investigated it. 
6.  Conflicts in specific regulatory functions 
6.1 Listing  rules: 
-  Exchange competes with listed companies 
-  Exchange has business relationship with listed companies 
-  Customer relationship with major listings customers 
-  Cross-subsidization of trading business 
6.2  Market surveillance and regulation 
-  Exchange competes with regulated broker-dealers 
-  Customer relationship with major broker-dealer customers 
6.3 Member  regulation 
-  Exchange competes with regulated broker-dealers 
-  Customer relationship with major broker-dealer customers 
6.4  Clearing and settlement 
-  Competing markets must use Exchange’s clearing services 
-  Monopolistic pricing of utility services  
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Conflict between business and regulation mandates 
Description:  Conflicts can arise between an exchange’s role as market operator 
with responsibilities for supervising trading and monitoring listed companies’ disclosure 
on its markets and its role as a commercial entity. 
Exchange view:  While perspectives vary, most exchanges argue that reputation 
is their stock in trade, and that as commercial enterprises they can ill afford regulatory 
problems that would jeopardize confidence in their markets and threaten their brands. 
They argue that regulation is integral to their business, and they would continue to do the 
job even if they were not required to. 
Some listed exchanges believe the pressure to regulate well is much greater for a 
commercial entity than a club, because while brand damage and loss of business are 
threats to both, a public company is subject to greater scrutiny, is more sensitive to the 
threat of loss of business, and has greater incentives to practice sound risk management. 
Risk management is a corporate governance issue and the board is responsible to 
shareholders to ensure that risk management programs address the threat posed by 
inadequate regulation. The view is that regulatory risk will be reflected in the exchange’s 
share price and cost of capital.  
A minority of exchanges acknowledge that conflicts are significant and that a 
strong business orientation requires regulatory functions and powers to be minimized. 
Regulator view:  The majority of regulators believe conflicts are likely to be 
exacerbated in for-profit exchanges, but feel the conflicts are manageable. Generally 
regulators believe that better scrutiny and oversight is called for, at a minimum. At the 
other end of the spectrum, a few regulators saw conflicts as significant enough to reverse 
the demutualization trend. As the implications of commercial pressures for regulatory 
functions become evident, they believe exchanges will revert to non-profit utilities. 
Responses:  The overall conflict between the two mandates can only be addressed 
by broad safeguards that address an exchange’s overall handling of its regulatory 
responsibilities, as opposed to measures intended to address specific types of conflict. 
Responses in this category include: 
  Organizational separation of regulation functions from business operations, or 
transfer of functions to another regulator. 
  Corporate governance mechanisms, such as composition of the board and board 
committees to oversee regulation. 
  Regulatory oversight of board of directors’ and management decisions on policy 
and programs.  
  Regulatory oversight of performance of regulatory functions and public interest 
obligations. 
 
Conclusion:  Specific conflicts are frequently managed by escalating decisions or 
ensuring appropriate corporate governance stewardship or management supervision, but 
these responses only move management of the conflict to the highest level, where  
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arguably the conflict is greatest because it is the responsibility of the board and senior 
management to reconcile the two mandates. This kind of response places a high degree of 
reliance on the integrity of people and processes at the top, and on supervision of their 
management of conflicts by the regulator. 
 
Box 3:  Responses to potential conflicts of interest 
The NASD and Nasdaq believe conflict of interest is the primary issue to be addressed and it is easier to 
manage conflicts and to focus business on customers when a separate and independent body carries out 
core regulatory functions. They decided that Nasdaq would be more successful as a business, and the 
NASD more successful as a SRO, if their roles were separated. Nasdaq obviously believes that quality 
regulation is important to its business, just as regulated exchanges do. The difference is it does not feel 
it is necessary to control the daily operations of the SRO in order to deliver quality regulation.  
 
In Singapore authorities and industry leaders concluded that conflicts are not significantly greater 
notwithstanding the fact that the exchange performs broad regulatory roles similar to U.S. SROs.  As 
part of Singapore’s financial reforms, a high-powered committee (led by the chair of the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore) looked at the securities regulatory regime. While some major reforms were 
made, SGX’s SRO role was left untouched. Conflict and public interest issues were considered, but 
were not viewed as major concerns. SGX considers its SRO functions to be an important asset for 
business development and does not see it as a conflict in the current business model because regulatory 
functions are embedded in the business. In future competitive pressures could give rise to concerns such 
as free riding or an uneven playing field. 
 
Hong Kong is one of a very few jurisdictions to implement a comprehensive set of conflict 
management safeguards. HKEx felt major conflicts did not exist but it was prudent to implement 
safeguards to mitigate and manage any that might arise. The main focus was on Listings because it is a 
major source of revenue and HKEx has a major role in regulating listed companies. Also, its trading 
regulation is limited. The safeguards include: 
1.      The Exchange and its directors have a legal duty to act in the public interest, and to place 
the public interest first in the event of any conflict between it and the exchange’s business 
interests; 
2.      The maximum shareholding is 5% unless exempted by SFC; 
3.      The Board of HKEx has public interest directors (appointed by Government); 
4.      SFC has a power of direction over the HKEx where conflict arises in regulation; 
5.      The Exchange maintains strict separation of its Regulation and Risk Management Dept. 
from business units; 
6.      The HKEx has established a Conflicts Committee to address conflicts that arise in 
relationships with listed companies; 
7.      The SFC can assume the Exchange’s regulatory responsibilities in any case where it is not 
satisfied a conflict can be managed; 
8.      HKEx’s self-listing process was administered by SFC; 
9.      HKEx’s Chairman must be approved by the Chief Executive of Hong Kong and the SFC 
must approve HKEx’s CEO and COO. 
Conflict in funding regulation  
Description:  As exchanges concentrate on financial performance, questions 
about their willingness to adequately fund regulation functions arise. Regulation is a cost  
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center and functions that do not produce revenue are often subject to proportionately 
larger reductions when a corporation decides to reduce costs.  
 
Exchange view:  Exchanges say that this conflict has always existed – members 
were also interested in efficiency and keeping a lid on costs. In fact, several exchanges 
indicated there was a greater conflict when members controlled the exchange because 
they not only favoured lower costs, they also had an interest in limiting the scope of 
regulation. These exchanges argue that a corporation and its shareholders actually have a 
greater interest in maintaining sound regulation as a matter of risk management: any 
regulatory failure could severely damage the business. 
 
Regulator view:  According to the SEC, it is vital for an exchange to believe that 
its reputation, and consequently its investment in regulation, is crucial to its business and 
an essential component of its strategy, if this conflict is to be managed successfully. 
Overall, regulators are not highly concerned about this conflict because they have not 
seen evidence of a greater problem yet.   If one arises, they believe their oversight powers 




  Transfer and streamlining of regulatory functions 
  Oversight of regulatory programs, budgets and resources 
  Corporate governance mechanisms, such as public interest / independent directors 
or board committees to oversee regulation 
 
Conclusion:  The question is whether the conflict is increased in a for-profit 
environment. Business pressures intensify scrutiny of costs, and it is generally accepted 
that for-profit exchanges manage costs better and keep all forms of costs under the 
microscope.
6  Business case analysis questions the rationale for any costs that do not 
produce business benefits. Mutual exchanges are not as disciplined in this regard because 
financial performance is not their central measure of success, it is merely one of a number 
of objectives and often the target is simply to cover costs. 
 
Some exchanges admitted their commitment to regulatory funding could change 
based on the fortunes of the company and market – the real question is what happens 
when exchanges are under financial pressure and losing money. This has yet to be tested, 
although the current market environment is grim. Going forward we should expect 
exchanges to apply a more rigorous approach to measuring the performance of staff and 
use of resources. But the application of business disciplines is not necessarily a negative. 
It will improve efficiency and performance, and the allocation of regulatory resources. 
 
Conflict in administration of operating rules 
Description:   Conflicts arise in the ongoing administration of rules and programs 
since exchanges have the authority to make administrative decisions that affect the 
                                                 
6   World Federation of Exchanges 2000 annual report  
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interests of customers in all areas of SRO operations. Even if business and regulatory 
goals are broadly aligned, they clearly can diverge in individual cases, for example when 
considering whether to investigate or discipline a major customer, or what sanction to 
apply. 
 
Exchanges administer enforcement programs and have discretionary authority 
over investigations, case management and discipline.  An exchange’s handling of 
sensitive decisions and cases may call into question the thoroughness and integrity of its 
regulatory operations, or whether it is administering them in a neutral and unbiased 
fashion. 
 
An issue that is often overlooked in assessing the incentives that influence 
regulatory decisions is whether regulatory staff will be compensated in part based on the 
exchange’s profits or financial performance. Compensation is designed to influence 
behaviour. If regulatory staff receives bonuses and stock options based on the exchange’s 
financial performance, it appears to be a clear conflict of interest because regulators’ 
compensation is linked to customer interests. Exchanges are in a difficult spot because 
they do not want to drive a cultural wedge between business and regulatory staff. They 
argue that if business and regulatory goals are in alignment, conflict is not an issue. 
 
Exchange view:  Exchanges generally acknowledge this conflict. Some cite it as a 
major reason to reduce or transfer regulatory functions. Others suggest it can be managed 
with appropriate safeguards, including organizational separation of regulation 
departments. 
 
Regulator view:  Regulators see the potential for greater conflicts as exchanges 
are subject to greater commercial pressures, which requires stricter oversight.  But few 
regulators commented on how conflicts might influence the exercise of regulatory 
discretion. 
 
Responses:  Many regulators appeared to have limited means to identify case-
specific conflicts. At a minimum, the threat of increased conflict in exercising regulatory 
authority demands that new safeguards be put in place to reduce the possibility of either 
the business units or customers attempting to influence regulatory decisions, to  identify 
potential conflicts of interest in specific regulatory decisions, and to ensure they are 
handled appropriately. Responses include: 
 
   Organizational separation of regulation and business functions 
   Conflict committees and similar internal procedures at exchanges 
   Internal policies on handling potential conflicts 
   Regulatory oversight of handling of potential customer conflicts 
   Transfer of case files to the regulator if necessary to address conflicts 
   Outsourcing of regulatory functions. 
 
Conclusion:   Strong measures are required to ensure that the integrity of an 
exchange’s regulatory program is maintained and that it handles regulatory issues and  
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decisions in a neutral and unbiased manner. This should be a priority for regulators in 
addressing demutualizations and oversight programs. 
 
Conflict in regulating competitors 
Description:  There are two types of conflict:  
 
1.  The conflict arising between an exchange and a participating broker-dealer that 
provides competing trading services and is subject to the exchange’s supervision. 
The primary example is an alternative trading system (ATS) that is a member or 
participant in an exchange. Large broker-dealers also compete with exchanges as 
liquidity providers, mainly by internalizing the matching of orders. 
2.  The conflict between an exchange and a listed company that provides any 
services in competition with the exchange. Conversely, an exchange may favour 
a company that it has a business relationship with. As exchanges broaden their 
businesses the number of these conflicts increases. The broader an exchange’s 
listing rules and regulation program, the greater the conflict is.  
 
These conflicts can in turn arise in several areas including: 
 
  Rulemaking that favours the exchange’s business or is biased against a competing 
business. Exchanges make policy and rules that can affect the interests of 
customers.  
  Using investigation and enforcement powers in a biased manner. 
  Making administrative decisions affecting firms that compete with the exchange 
in a biased or unfair manner.  
  Predatory regulatory practices such as delays in responding to complaints or 
imposition of burdensome procedures. 
  Improper use of confidential information about regulated firms for business 
instead of regulatory purposes. 
 
Exchange view:  Few exchanges outside the U.S. recognize conflict issues in 
regulating competing trading entities because ATSs are not a significant source of 
competition for order flow. Because of market structure and liquidity differences, 
internalization of order flow by ATSs and major dealers is not as big an issue in markets 
outside the U.S.  
 
Australia has experienced broader potential for conflicts in this area because of 
the number of new business initiatives ASX has pursued, including share registry 
services, order routing and market data services, futures trading and clearing, a trading 
linkage with the Singapore exchange, and ASX World Link to provide access to US and 





Box 4:  Regulating competitors 
 
Exchanges are also listing on other exchanges that may be competitors, for example  CME on NYSE. This 
raises a different sort of conflict that regulators must address.  
The starkest example of the listings conflict is in Australia, where the SFE is a listed company on ASX 
and subject to its supervision, while ASX operates a competing futures market. However, under the law, 
ASIC may assume responsibility for handling initial and ongoing listing functions from ASX on 
application of a company that competes with ASX.  
The issue of conflicts in regulating competing providers of market services arises primarily in the U.S. 
because of the number of  ATSs that are members of Nasdaq and regulated exchanges. The SEC rules 
governing ATSs give operators a choice of regulatory status: become an exchange with SRO 
responsibilities, or become a member of an SRO, which has full regulatory oversight. ATSs that join an 
SRO must comply with its rules. The SEC believes that its oversight of SROs is sufficient to address any 
conflicts of interest. 
The UK government recognized the principle that public regulatory powers should not be delegated to an 
exchange that competes for listings with other markets in its decision to transfer the LSE’s designation as 
the UK listing authority to the FSA.  
 
 
Regulator view:   Regulators’ views are similar to the exchanges’ in each 
jurisdiction, according to the likelihood or experience of each type of competitive 
conflict.   Some regulators that are particularly concerned with competition policy feel 
they must address the impact of conflicts on the behaviour of exchanges, especially 
where the exchange has monopoly power.  In other jurisdictions the issue is primarily 
within the purview of competition regulators.  Competition issues tend to be a lower 




  Conflicts Committees at exchanges to review handling of potential conflicts 
  Regulator review of handling of sensitive cases 
  Transfer handling of specific files to the regulator 
  Reduce scope of Exchange’s Listing rules and authority 
  Separation or outsourcing of market regulation functions from exchange. 
 
Conclusion:  This seems to be one of the most serious areas of conflict faced by 
for-profit entities, because business diversification can create unforeseen new conflicts. 
Furthermore, competition in core exchange services is expected to grow. Conflicts that 




Definition:  Two areas of conflict arise: 
 
1.  The conflict involved in an exchange assessing whether it meets its own 
listing requirements. 
2.  The conflict arising when an exchange monitors trading in its own stock 
and makes decisions on whether to review or investigate trading for any 
reason. 
Exchange and Regulator view:  Exchanges and regulators universally recognize 
the conflicts that arise when an exchange lists its securities on its own market. 
 
Responses:  Virtually all jurisdictions with listed exchanges have taken steps to 
address these conflicts. Approval of the listing pursuant to the listing rules has been the 
responsibility of the regulator. Administration of the listing rules in respect of the 
exchange’s listing has either been transferred to the regulator, or is subject to close 
oversight by the regulator. Similarly, surveillance of trading in the exchange’s stock is 
either the regulator’s direct responsibility or is closely supervised by it. 
 
Conclusion:  This conflict is fairly narrow in nature and easily defined. As such, 
the measures needed to manage it are clear. Our research did not identify any situations 
where this conflict became a practical problem. 
 
MANAGING POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
This section expands on the brief description of the types of responses that 
exchanges and regulators are implementing for the purpose of managing the conflicts of 
interest involved in a for-profit exchange carrying out regulatory responsibilities. 
Responses range from an exchange retaining its full self-regulatory responsibilities but 
completely separating these functions from its business activities to an exchange having 
supervision functions removed from it and their being undertaken by the government 
regulatory authority. 
 
Enhancing exchange internal controls and management processes 
Many exchanges have a history of clear separation of regulatory operations from 
business functions, especially exchanges in Anglo-American legal systems. Given the 
potential for greater conflicts of interest in for-profit exchanges, the view that segregation 
of functions should be required (if not in place before) or strengthened (if separated 
before) is widespread. Segregation takes the form of complete organizational separation 
of regulation units from business development and trading units. The approach varies, for 
instance on the level at which separation occurs. The best practice is for regulation to 
report separately to the CEO. Opinions differ on the definition of regulation functions. 
Many exchanges treat listings as a regulatory function while others do not. 
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Internal controls or processes are widely used as safeguards against conflicts 
influencing regulatory decisions. Examples include imposition of information firewalls, 
measures to safeguard confidential information and conflict management processes such 
as internal guidelines for handling potential conflicts, conflict committees and internal 
audit processes. Separate financial accounting for regulatory functions should be 
employed to ensure regulatory costs are transparent, cost allocation is appropriate and to 
show cross-subsidization of business operations does not occur. 
 
 
5:  Examples of corporate governance solutions 
 
A unique approach is ASX’s creation of an independent entity, ASX Supervisory Review, to supervise 
the delivery of its regulatory functions. ASX SR has its own board and acts as an independent auditor 
of ASX’s handling of regulation and conflicts of interest. ASX created the entity in response to 
pressure to move regulation to a separate body, which ASX felt would compromise its business 
because regulation is part of the product. ASX SR’s mandate is to report to the ASX Board on three 
areas: 
 
-  Review of listings decisions relating to companies that have a business relationship with ASX 
or are in competition with it, if the company elects to become a “review group entity” to ensure 
unbiased treatment; 
-  Review of funding for regulation functions; 
-  Review of supervision policies and procedures manuals for thoroughness and adequacy. 
 
The creation of Conflicts Committees to address any conflicts between a listed exchange and listed 
companies that it regulates appears to be an emerging best practice. Such committees are in place in 
Hong Kong, Singapore and Toronto. The Committees generally review any dealings with companies 
that the exchange either competes with or has business dealings with to ensure that listings rules are 
administered in an unbiased manner, and report their assessment to the regulator. In Hong Kong, 
issues are referred to the SFC even a conflict could even perceived be perceived – for example, a 
listing application from a company that provides back office services to HKEx.  The make-up of such 
committees is also an issue. Most are comprised of exchange executives, but Toronto recently agreed 
to add independent members to its Conflicts Committee. 
In conjunction with a reorganization of regulatory responsibilities, Thailand’s SET moved its 
regulation functions into a separate department reporting directly to president, and last year separated 
market surveillance from market operations. The separation of business and regulation functions has 
helped to clarify mandates and address perceptions of conflict, according to the exchange. 
 
Other types of internal processes that we noted include improved governance 
processes for SRO functions, such as appointment of Board-level regulation or risk 
management committees and adoption of codes of ethics to reinforce the neutrality and 
fairness of SRO processes. Exchanges normally disclose and promote the internal 
processes they have adopted, which informs market participants about steps being taken 
to manage conflicts, or prevent them from arising. Several exchanges noted their status as 
SROs sets them apart from the standard corporate model, and requires that regulated 
firms be represented on the board as major stakeholders. 
 
With demutualization, the composition of the board should generally reflect the 
shareholder base, but given the public interest and regulatory obligations of exchanges, 
many jurisdictions also insist that other stakeholders continue to be represented in order 
to provide checks and balances in the governance structure. A requirement for public  
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interest or independent directors is common. Some countries, including the U.S., insist on 
member or industry directors so securities firms are not disenfranchised as ownership 
moves to investors. Others, such as the UK and Australia, impose a fit and proper 
requirement for directors of a regulated exchange.  
 
 
Box 6:  Approaches to corporate governance 
Hong Kong and Singapore have retained the category of public interest directors appointed by 
Government even after listing, in recognition of the exchanges’ express public interest obligations. In 
addition, the top executives of both exchanges are subject to the approval of Government or the 
regulator. 
The German model is unique in requiring separate legal entities and governance structures for the 
exchange as a public entity and the market operator. The Exchange Council governs the exchange 
and represents stakeholders in the market. State government closely supervises it, and may attend its 
meetings. The operator of the exchange may be a private or listed company (for example, Deutsche 
Borse) that is governed and run as a standard corporate entity. 
The UK FSA has reinforced the responsibility of the board for regulation by requiring exchanges to 
give the executive in charge of regulation direct access to the chairman and the board if any 
regulatory concerns arise that the executive feels are not being addressed by management. 
 
The presence of public interest or independent directors is considered to be an 
important safeguard against conflicts of interest. In many emerging markets the 
government retains a significant role in selection of these directors. Independent directors 
can be defined in two ways. The traditional meaning in corporate governance parlance is 
a director who is independent of the company and its management – a true outside 
director. In an exchange context, the term often refers to a director who is independent of 
the securities industry and brokerage firms that owned the exchange prior to 
demutualization (and which often retain a major stake even post demutualization). 
 
Finally, some jurisdictions have imposed requirements on the executives who 
manage the exchange following demutualization. These range from general fit and proper 
tests imposed on all registrants to specific approval requirements for top appointments. 
Imposing ownership restrictions 
Many exchanges have set limits on the share ownership position of any one 
person or company. Ownership limits can serve several purposes, including: 
 
  Preventing a take-over of an exchange by one user or control group 
  Preventing a take-over of a SRO by a regulated firm 
  Limiting potential conflicts between the interests of shareholders and the interests 
of user-stakeholders 
  Managing potential conflicts between an exchange’s public interest and 
regulatory obligations and the interests of shareholders. 
 
In addition, an express or at least implicit reason for ownership limits is often to 
prevent a take-over of the local exchange by a foreign company. In most cases, the 
restrictions can be raised or lifted with the approval of the regulator or the government,  
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which enables them to review a proposed transaction that would give a party a significant 
stake in, or control, of the exchange. 
 
 
Box 7:  Examples of ownership restrictions 
The Swedish government retains the power to prevent a change of control in OM Group, owner of the 
Stockholm Exchange, through a “golden share” that gives it the right to exercise voting control of the 
company.  
Hong Kong and Singapore exchanges have ownership caps of 5% but the regulator or government has 
authority to raise the limits on application, for instance to accommodate a strategic investor or an 
alliance with other exchanges. National interest concerns about maintaining local control are more 
important factors than controlling ownership and governance conflicts in these jurisdictions. 
In Australia, the Financial Services Reform Act 2001 imposes a 15% ownership restriction on  operators 
of financial markets and clearing and settlement facilities which are of “national significance”. The 
Australian Government also has the power to decide on whether to approve any foreign acquisition of at 
least 15%  control of ASX or SFE under the Foreign Takeovers Act. 
TSX raised its limit from 5% to 10% in conjunction with its listing in fall 2002, by agreement with its 
supervising Commission. 
 
Reinforcing the exchange’s public interest mandate 
The authorities may reinforce the existing public interest mandates of exchanges 
in the course of approving demutualization as a means of addressing conflicts between 
those mandates and the business of the exchange. This has occurred in the U.S., Australia 
and Canada, and may take the form of changes to the law, conditions to approval of 
demutualization or conditions for licensing of the exchange.  
 
 
Box 8:  Examples of reinforcement of the public interest mandate 
In Hong Kong and Singapore, the law expressly states that in the event of any conflict between the 
public interest and the exchange’s business interests, the public interest must prevail. In Hong Kong, 
directors and officers of HKEx have a legal duty to place the public interest first. Singapore’s MAS has 
the power to issue a directive to SGX if it considers public interest considerations require it. At the time 
of financial reform, SGX’s public interest role was the subject of significant debate. The public policy 
view is that SGX has public interest obligations and it cannot act strictly in accordance with its 
commercial interests. 
 
Strengthening supervision by the regulator 
If there is one area of commonality in regulators’ responses to demutualization, it 
is imposition of a heightened level of oversight of the exchange. Effective government 
oversight is viewed as a backstop by both exchanges and regulators. It is considered 
essential to ensuring conflict does not lead to lower standards. Some exchanges 






Stronger oversight may take several forms, including: 
 
  Increased scrutiny of governance and management, including board decisions and 
business initiatives in order to ensure compliance with public interest obligations; 
  Strengthened examination of scope and content of regulatory programs and 
processes; 
  Review of resources and budgets for SRO operations; 
  Review of effectiveness of processes and procedures in place to manage conflicts 
of interest, including organizational structures and information firewalls; 
  Specific review of handling of listings, surveillance and investigation files where 
conflicts may arise; 
  Closer examination of proposed rule changes to ensure appropriate standards are 
maintained and no adverse impact on competition results; 
  Monitoring of exchanges’ financial strength and viability. 
 
Of course the SRO functions are the most closely examined to ensure they are 
carried out effectively and any conflicts are dealt with appropriately. More stringent 
oversight of an exchange’s disciplinary processes and management of enforcement cases 
should be imposed to ensure that they are not influenced by conflicts or business 




Box 9:  Examples of stronger supervision 
Some regulators have been granted explicit new powers to intervene where conflicts of interest or 
commercial pressures create concerns about how the exchange is carrying out SRO obligations or 
public interest mandate. Several forms of intervention powers exist: 
-  Power to issue a directive to the exchange (UK, Australia, Singapore) 
-  Power to make a decision for the exchange (or reverse a decision) (Canada) 
-  Power to directly assume an exchange function or handling of a file (Hong Kong, Australia 
on request of issuer) 
Although organizational structures and internal processes are important, the SEC believes they cannot 
control the risks of conflicts of interest through direct regulation such as mandating processes. 
Continuous oversight is crucial. For instance, the SEC needs to push some exchanges to implement 
adequate surveillance programs for new products.  Oversight must be tailored to the circumstances of 
each exchange. If sufficiently concerned about an SRO’s management of its regulatory functions, the 
SEC said they could require an exchange to contract them out to another SRO. They could also 
address free rider problem by allowing one exchange to charge another for regulatory services.  
The UK FSA does not treat for-profit exchanges much differently in supervising them. The FSA, the 
Department of the Treasury and the Bank of England were all involved in discussions on LSE’s and 
LIFFE’s demutualization. Conflicts of interest and governance were major issues, but significant 
changes in oversight or delivery of the exchanges’ (narrow) regulatory functions were not considered 
necessary. FSA manages the conflict issue as part of its ongoing oversight, which includes open 
communications with exchanges that provide a kind of early warning system if any changes are 
contemplated. Each exchange has a designated supervisor. For instance, a proposal to reduce 
resources in regulation would raise issues for review. The FSA also has the power to direct an 
Exchange to change its regulatory program but haven’t used the power of direction so far. The FSA is 
now developing a risk-based approach to supervision of Exchanges.   
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Improved oversight may also involve requiring exchanges to increase the 
transparency of their regulatory processes, for instance by notice and comment process 
for rule changes. This enables interested parties, including regulated firms and 
competitors, to comment on proposed new rules. These processes strengthen the 
regulator’s ability to identify and address concerns with proposed exchange rules 
(including conflicts issues) and respond to them. 
 
Introducing special procedures for self-listing 
In cases where exchanges are self-listing on their own boards, regulators are 
universally taking a more direct role in both approving the listing under the exchange’s 
requirements and handling surveillance of trading in the exchange’s stock. In some cases, 
the regulator assumes direct responsibility for administering the listing rules as they apply 
to the exchange’s listing. In others, the regulator imposes stronger reporting requirements 
and heightened supervision on the exchange in handling the listing. Similarly, some 
regulators assume responsibility for monitoring trading in the exchange’s stock, while in 
others the exchange continues to monitor trading under special supervision of the 
regulator. 
Outsourcing regulatory functions 
Despite widespread concerns about conflicts, very few exchanges have gone so 
far as to spin off regulatory functions to independent entities. Two markets that have are 
Nasdaq and Toronto.  
 
 
Box 10:  Examples of outsourcing 
Many international observers believe the Nasdaq model is one of complete separation of the market 
and regulation, but that is far from the case: 
-  Nasdaq remains responsible for its SRO responsibilities but it has contracted the day-to-day 
administration and decisions involved in market regulation by contracting services to 
NASDR.  
-  Nasdaq continues to perform several regulatory functions directly, including listings 
regulation and the stock watch function of market surveillance.  
-  Since the outsourced functions are carried out on its behalf by NASDR under contract, 
Nasdaq continues to have significant control over the quality and costs of regulation, and it is 
involved in decisions on policy and approach.  
-  Nasdaq continues to set its own rules and must administer and enforce them.  
Toronto has transferred market regulation, including surveillance and investigations, to a new SRO 
that it owns a 50% stake in, but which has independent governance. TSX continues to perform all 
listings functions and to administer its business trading rules. The SRO, Market Regulation Services, 




Even if an exchange spins off or outsources regulation to avoid conflicts, 
competitive and financial pressures still create pressure to cut regulatory costs, unless the 
costs are funded independently from the exchange. 
Transferring regulatory functions to government regulators 
A number of jurisdictions have transferred regulatory responsibilities from the 
exchanges to government regulators, and reduced the scope of self-regulation accordingly. 
Examples include the UK, France, Mexico and Hong Kong. Where this has occurred, 
several factors are behind the changes, with demutualization or commercialization of 
exchanges being just one. Others include elimination of duplication and placing 
responsibility with a commission or similar body that has the legal power and jurisdiction 
to more effectively enforce rules. 
 
While government or regulatory policy initiates regulatory transfers, we found 
that exchanges usually favour the changes because it enables them to focus their efforts 
on areas that are most relevant to them and where their capabilities are strong, while also 
reducing costs. Exchanges are generally comfortable in the regulatory roles assigned to 
them, even if they are quite narrow, as is the case in the UK and much of Europe. The 
only example of exchanges opposing loss of regulatory authority is in the EU, where 
some (but not all) exchanges are resisting the centralization of all regulatory functions in 
one competent authority in each country, because it could lead to the virtual elimination 
of any regulatory role for the exchanges.  
 
There appears to be a trend toward exchanges passing on investigative files to 
regulators at an earlier stage, leaving most of the investigative work to the regulator, 
based on the view that exchanges should not be doing work that involves enforcement of 
public laws, especially criminal law. 
 
 
Box 11:  Examples of transferred regulation 
In Hong Kong, the SFC assumed responsibility for broker or member regulation as part of the 
demutualization process. The Exchange only does market regulation to the extent of exchange trading 
rules, which are mostly “business rules”; all breaches of law, including manipulation and insider 
trading, are the responsibility of SFC, including surveillance and monitoring. The SFC now proposes to 
take on more authority over listings, particularly the continued listing rules which contain many 
provisions governing corporate conduct that, as exchange rules, lack statutory backing and which are 
usually found in companies law elsewhere.  
In Thailand, functions such as broker oversight and supervision of issuers’ financials moved to the 
SEC from the exchange as a result of a joint SEC / SET review process initiated early in 2001. This 
reflected several objectives, including the exchange’s objective to emphasize business development 
and focus on regulatory functions directly tied to trading, to streamline services and eliminate overlap 
in member regulation. This also occurred in the context of ongoing discussions on demutualization. 
In Germany, the public and operational functions of exchanges are separated by law.  Regulatory 
functions are public in nature and are governed by the Exchange Council, which represents 
stakeholders in the markets. Each exchange is required to establish regulatory and control bodies, 
including Trading Surveillance Unit, Listing Admission Board, and Disciplinary Committee. Each 
exchange must have an operator, which are increasingly commercial entities such as Deutsche 
Borse. In practice the system is a compromise between separating regulatory functions from the 




Demutualization of exchanges raises new conflicts of interest in carrying out 
front-line regulatory roles. These conflicts are usually greater than those that existed 
previously, even though certain conflicts they faced as a mutual may be reduced. 
The degree of conflict of interest involved in carrying out regulatory roles 
depends on: 
  The scope and intensity of the exchange's regulatory roles 
  Effectiveness of safeguards put in place to manage conflicts 
  The model of demutualization in place 
  Intensity of competitive pressures 
  The exchange’s regulatory culture and tradition. 
 
Changing an exchange’s SRO responsibilities, or even restructuring the SRO 
system entirely, is an approach that can significantly reduce or eliminate conflicts of 
interest, but it involves radical change for an exchange and the regulatory system as a 
whole. In identifying alternative structures for self-regulatory functions which have been 
adopted in various countries, we are not advocating that a new market structure should be 
implemented when an exchange demutualizes, rather that exploring the application of 
practical models to local conditions helps to define the issues and explore possible 
solutions to conflict of interest issues that are raised by demutualization. 
Regulatory models for managing potential conflicts 
 
The essential benefits of each model in terms of managing conflicts of interest are 
set out below. Five basic approaches to devising a self-regulatory system are possible, 
including the possibility of eliminating self-regulation. 
 
1.  Retain the exchange as primary SRO  
 
In most jurisdictions, one exchange is the sole (or primary) SRO for all self-
regulatory responsibilities. While this requires the exchange to manage a range of 
conflicts, it minimizes the scope of institutional change and ensures that regulatory staff 
stays close to the market. But conflicts of interest will be difficult to manage if the 
exchange is not committed to the full range of regulatory functions. Also, SRO 
obligations may divert focus from building competitive markets. 
 
Singapore and Australia both left the full range of self-regulatory functions to the 
exchange in large part because there was no alternative home for them. Both SGX and 






2.  Exchange retains market regulation only 
 
Under this approach, exchanges restrict their role to core market regulation 
functions. Any member regulation functions are transferred to another SRO or the 
statutory regulator. This reduces conflicts of interest but allows an exchange to retain 
basic market regulation, which most see as an integral feature of the market and central to 
their reputation and “brand”. Arguably an exchange has the biggest incentive to ensure 
market quality and provide efficient, responsive regulation, which significantly mitigates 
conflicts. Regulatory staff remains close to the market, retaining the expertise arising 
from both running and regulating a market. 
 
Exchanges responsible only for fairly narrow market regulation functions include 
LSE, Euronext, Stockholm, Mexico and Hong Kong. They concentrate on monitoring the 
market for compliance with the exchange’s trading rules only. 
 
3.  Exchange creates separate entity to carry out SRO functions  
 
If an exchange retains self-regulatory responsibilities, it must establish a separate 
corporate entity with independent governance to administer them. This approach could 
apply to any set of regulatory responsibilities. It could also enable several exchanges to 
consolidate their regulatory functions in one jointly owned entity. The model minimizes 
conflicts by creating a separate governance structure for SRO functions that focuses the 
board and management on their regulatory mandate without pressures from commercial 
objectives.  Similarly, the exchange’s board does not need to reconcile potentially 
conflicting mandates.  
 
The NASD implemented this approach before spinning off Nasdaq. It created 
separate subsidiaries to run Nasdaq and NASD Regulation. As another example, Toronto 
spun off its market regulation functions to Market Regulation Services, a separate 
company 50% owned by TSX. In both cases, the market operator remains responsible for 
performance of SRO functions, and has contracted the activities to the SRO. The Bombay 
Stock Exchange proposes to employ this approach as part of its demutualization plan. 
 
4.   Create a single independent SRO 
 
All self-regulatory responsibilities are centralized in one member owned SRO for 
the securities industry that is independent from the exchanges.  This approach obviously 
minimizes conflicts of interest because it requires exchanges to transfer the functions. It 
enables an exchange to focus its governance and management resources on the business, 
while the SRO’s mandate is simply to deliver effective regulation. The SRO’s 
independence and neutrality promotes competition, a level playing field and the 
maintenance of uniform market-wide rules and regulatory standards.  
 
On the other hand, it forces exchanges to offload services they may view as 
central to their business model and “brand”. Regulatory staff is not as close to the market, 
and synergies between market operations and regulation will be lost.  Regulatory 
services could become less responsive and more bureaucratic – the SRO could 
effectively become an arm of government instead of a self-regulator. Perhaps the biggest  
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obstacle to using independent SROs is the challenge of building a new regulatory agency 
from scratch, including deciding on ownership, governance, funding and jurisdiction. 
 
Three examples of independent SROs are the NASD and the National Futures 
Association in the U.S. and the Investment Dealers Association in Canada. When the U.S. 
Securities Industry Association released its paper on self-regulation and conflicts in 2000, 
a majority of SIA members favoured a “hybrid model” – leave market regulation to 
exchanges but centralize member regulation in one SRO in order to reduce inefficiencies 
and conflicts. The NYSE was opposed because it believes the synergies of integrated 
regulation are of significant value.  The SIA did not endorse the unified SRO model 




5.   Consolidate regulation in statutory regulator  
 
Eliminating self-regulation by transferring all responsibilities to a statutory 
regulator clearly eliminates any perception of conflict, at the expense of the benefits of 
self-regulation. It could also compromise the strategic and competitive position of an 
exchange. 
 
The UK took this approach with the advent of the FSA. While the exchanges 
remain responsible for basic market supervision, the universal statutory regulator has 
effectively supplanted self-regulation in financial services. In addition, the LSE was 
required to relinquish its role as the “competent authority for listing” to the FSA. 
 
Lessons learned in looking to the future 
 
In an increasingly competitive environment, demutualization is an approach to the 
corporate structure of exchanges that is relevant to both small and emerging markets.  
The more exposed an exchange is to competition, the greater the need to realize the 
benefits of a commercial orientation and focus. Even if competition is limited, benefits 
may be realized from a commercial governance and business model, including clearer 
measures of performance, increased efficiency, and improved innovation and business 
development.  Since the trend towards commercialization of exchanges may be expected 
to continue in all types of markets, the issues examined in this study are relevant for all 
markets.  The study’s primary findings are summarized below. 
 
International practices in responses to conflicts can be identified in general terms, 
but no single best approach has emerged.  Many approaches are still being tested.  The 
primary responses include: 
 
  separation and independent management of SRO functions from business 
units 
  strong oversight by public authorities, including processes to identify and 
address conflicts 
  internal controls and processes at exchanges to identify and manage conflicts 
                                                 
7   GAO p. 28  
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  corporate governance processes to oversee the management of conflicts and 
protect the public interest 
  management of self-listings by the supervising regulator 
  specific conflict management processes tailored to the needs of each 
regulatory function performed. 
 
The type and the scope of safeguards must be proportionate to the degree of 
potential conflict and the experience of actual conflict, and must be appropriate given the 
scope and nature of the exchange's regulatory functions. 
 
Responsibility for regulatory roles may be consistent with a demutualized 
exchange’s business strategy if it views effective regulation as a core asset.  Regulatory 
functions should directly support and add value to the business.  If regulation is not 
integral to an exchange's strategy, it should minimize regulation functions to activities 
that it would carry out as a business even in the absence of any SRO obligations or 
oversight.  Some exchanges believe regulation is integral to their product and some do 
not.  If regulation is not integral to an exchange’s business model, it should not be 
responsible for broad regulatory functions, because the conflicts will become 
unmanageable. An exchange is unlikely to do an effective regulatory job if it does not 
have strong incentives to do it well.  This is not a strict either / or proposition – it is a 
question of degree. For instance, basic market surveillance may be a core function and 
everything else tangential, depending on the circumstances. 
  Demutualization may require reallocation of certain regulatory functions from an 
exchange to public authorities or another SRO. Regulators should not require exchanges 
to perform expansive self-regulatory functions simply because there are no other SROs to 
perform them.  An exchange should continue to perform a full range of self-regulatory 
functions only if responsibility for those functions is consistent with its business strategy. 
Logically, an exchange organized as a business should have the flexibility to choose the 
strategy that is appropriate to its circumstances. This implies that an exchange should 
only perform regulatory functions that it considers to be relevant to its business.
8 
If regulatory responsibilities need to be reallocated, difficult questions arise about 
who is going to assume the functions involved, and how to pay for them.  The difficulties 
involved in finding solutions to these problems, as well as legal impediments to 
transferring responsibilities, explain much of the reluctance to changing the status quo in 
many jurisdictions. 
 
In an emerging market, government and regulators may require an exchange to 
perform a broader range of self-regulatory functions because they have concluded that the 
exchange can most effectively perform the relevant functions. However, this approach 
should only be taken if all parties, including the owners of the exchange, are clear on the 
implications for the exchange’s objectives. It may imply a demutualization model that is 
not strictly commercial but rather combines business and public interest objectives. 
 
   Imposing certain public interest obligations on an exchange is not inconsistent 
with demutualization, provided that they are defined in a manner that is consistent with 
                                                 
8      It is recognized that many developed markets currently impose a broad range of self-regulatory functions on 
exchanges by law, including the United States.  
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the exchange's business strategy. The public interest mandate cannot be so broadly 
defined as to undermine the basic objectives of demutualization.    The wider an 
exchange's public interest role, the more it retains quasi-public utility status, even if 
demutualized. Imposing broad public interest obligations on an exchange is difficult to 
reconcile with its business mandate and objectives. 
 
An emerging market may be at a stage of development that requires a different 
policy response on public interest obligations. If non-commercial objectives are a priority 
the stakeholder model of demutualization is a useful model, provided that the owners 
accept the tradeoffs implied for profitability. In this model, the profit objective is 
balanced with public interest and stakeholder objectives, such as long-term market 
development initiatives. The relative priority of objectives should be clearly defined, 
including the implications for rate of return.  
 
Similarly, government and regulators in an emerging market may require an 
exchange to perform a broader range of self-regulatory functions because they have 
concluded that the exchange can most effectively perform the relevant functions. This 
approach should only be taken if all parties, including the owners of the exchange, are 
clear on the implications for the exchange’s objectives.  
 
Emerging markets regulators and exchanges should strive to achieve a mutually-
reinforcing set of conditions in order to support effective self-regulation by a demutualized 
exchange: 
 
  Strong and effective oversight by the statutory regulator 
  Tradition and culture of effective self-regulation 
  Legal and regulatory framework that clearly sets out an exchange’s self-
regulatory responsibilities and public interest obligations 
  Selection of a demutualization model that is compatible with the self-
regulatory framework and the business strategy established for the exchange 
  Implementation of effective measures to identify and manage conflicts of 
interest on an ongoing basis 
  Appropriate corporate governance of an exchange’s regulatory responsibilities 
  Independent management and administration of regulatory functions and 
enforcement of rules, including organizational separation of SRO functions 
from business units 
  Regulatory leadership and staff with demonstrable experience, expertise and 
integrity  
  Allocation of sufficient resources to SRO functions 
  If competition exists, consistent standards of regulation and a level playing 
field among market centres. 
 
In conclusion, a new paradigm is developing among exchanges world-wide.  The 
former prevailing model of mutual exchange-SROs is being supplanted by the for-profit 
business model.  This change is evolutionary, and is progressing at different paces in each 
jurisdiction, depending on a host of local factors.  But the trend is undeniably global.  
Both regulators and exchanges are increasingly recognizing that the kinds of regulatory 
functions that were appropriate for the old model are not all appropriate for a business- 
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driven exchange.  The change also demands new governance, management and 
organizational structures designed to protect the integrity of regulatory services.  As this 
trend matures, we will likely see increasing international convergence in the mechanisms 
used to manage conflicts of interest by regulators and exchanges. 